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CASE NO. 14362 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT 
•*• 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by plaintiff below from a Declaratory Judgment 
in the District Court for Uintah County by Judge George E. Ball if concern-
ing a contract, admitted of execution by defendant, but by answering with 
affirmative defenses that there was material alteration. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judgment was given defendant. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal on grounds the court did not 
apply a correct rule of burden of proof nor standard of evidence. Plaintiff 
deposited $4100 with the court which was not disposed of in the judgment. 
Said deposit should be returned to plaintiff-appellant. Attorney fees for 
plaintiff to be reserved. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants offered to sell their dairy farm to plaintiff. Plaintiff made 
a counter offer which was accepted by defendants. 
Defendant respondent Youngs, desiring to sell their dairy farm,approached 
plaintiff stating a need for a large down payment becuase they wished to buy a 
business at the entrance to Zion National Park. (R 122) The price was $125,000, 
$33,000.00 down and the assumption of certain contract payments, bringing the 
costs which plaintiff would have to pay to $54,000. In addition, there was 
$22,000 plus interest as the first anniversary installment. (See Ex. 1) The 
parties negotiated, plaintiff stating "You will have to withhold some of these 
payments until another year so that we will have time to sell our steers and 
get some more money out of the milk cows to make the payments." *And they agreed 
to this, that we would forestall any payment on the $68,000 until November of 
'73 and the interest wasn't to accrue until '73. And this was agreed upon be-
cause we couldn't make the payment.... Q. And in this connection was the 1972 
altered to read 1973? A. Yes, it was." (Tr 67,68) "...in the first year ... 
we had to pay interest on the $33,000 plus taking on the baler that he still 
owed seventeen hundred on, plus the $12,000 to Mrs. Young plus interest, ... we 
were getting up to $54,000 and then if we made the $22,921 payment that runs us 
up to $77,000 the first year and that is a lot of money and we only had 7 months, 
and we couldn't meet that payment. So it had to be changed somewhere or I 
couldn't buy ... This was changed to ease the financial burden." (Tr 84) 
Plaintiff testified, "They agreed that we would forestall payment on the 
$68,000 and the interest wasn't to accrue until '73 ... that is what we agreed 
upon there." (Tr 86) 
There were three copies of the instrument, original and a carbon held by 
each the seller and buyer. There were approximately 25 places changed in the 
seven page Exhibit. Initialing appears on pages 2 and 5 but there are numerous 
changes, pen interlinations on all pages. The only controversy in this liti-
gation concerns the change on line 21 of page 2 of Exhibit 1. It is here the 
typewritten 2 is penned over with a 3 so that is reads: "Interest on the unpaid 
balance of $68,763.01 shall begin to accrue on the 10th day of April 1973." 
The change is clear, obvious. 
Banker N. J. Meagher, Jr. required the parties to initial their changes 
and then he read the entire instrument to the sellers and buyer. (Tr 30, 31. 
R 75, 37) They then signed in his presence and that of each other and the three 
instruments (Ex. 1, 2, 3) were acknowledged. He had said he was primarily con-
cerned with the original, but he asked the parties to conform their own copies 
to the original. He paid no attention to such an attempt. There was poor 
conformance. 
Plaintiff paid the considerations, and at the first anniversary in Novem-
ber of 1973 plaintiff went to the bank and asked Meagher to compute the interest 
and state the amount of the payment. This resulted in the banker's procurement 
of Exhibit 1 from the vault and the writing of a check in the hand of Mr. Meagher 
in the sum of $25,476.70 which plaintiff signed. Said check cleared. (Ex 6, 
Tr 39) Seven weeks later defendants caused a threatening certified letter to 
be delivered to plaintiff declaring "said contract...is now in default", ad-
ditional interest in the sum of $4,171.61 being demanded within the 60 day notice 
provision of Exhibit 1 so that "further action will not become necessary." 
(Exhibit 10) 
Plaintiff sought counsel; they went to the bank and asked for a certified 
copy of the original contract and received Exhibit "A" attached to the com-
plaint. Page 4 of the contract provided that in case of breach of the covenants 
to pay money, the sellers may, "at their option, declare this agreement termi-
nated and cancelled by serving upon the buyer a 60-day written notice of their 
intention so to do". The contract further provided "the sellers shall at their 
option re-enter and take possession ..." 
As an act of good faith, plaintiff deposited the $4171 into court, filing 
an action for declaratory judgment asking the court to "determine the meaning 
and legal effect of said contract" and to order payment to the person entitled 
thereto under their "respective legal or equitable obligations". Plaintiff 
asked that the Youngs be "enjoined from further harrassing plaintiff and putting 
him in jeopardy of default." Defendant had assigned so plaintiff joined the 
assignee bank as well as the escrow institution. The answers of the banks are 
formal. The banks are not a real party in the trial nor appeal. 
Defendants the Youngs answered admitting execution of the "original" of 
said contract as laying in escrow at the bank; then they pleaded affirmatively 
by way of confession and avoidance a number of defenses: 
1. "Taking exception with the accuracy of plaintiff's exhibit." 
2. "Defendant's copy does now show that April 10, 19?2was changed 
to...1973" and 
3. "Denies that said change was to be made on the original copy." 
4. "The original copy was altered ... contrary to defendants knowledge 
or permission" and 
5. "said change was not initialed by the defendants as shown on Exhibit 
"I"." 
6. "As an affirmative defense defendants allege that plaintiff is in 
default ... in that plaintiff has not paid $4,171 interest due and 
owing since Nov. 19, 1973 ..." 
7. "Defendants affirmatively allege that plaintiffs exhibit "A" is in 
error in that it has been changed on page 2 to read April 10, 1973 
from April 10, 1972 ... See attached defendant's exhibit "I"." (this 
is Ex 3 in our record) 
8. Defendant joined in the request and "further request the court to 
determine said legal effect in light of defendants Exhibit "I" and 
affirmative defense that said contract was altered contrary to de-
fendants permission." 
9. In addition, "defendants request that the court assess legal interest 
on the amount of $4,171.61 from November 18, 1973 together with 
attorney fees ." 
10. Defendant prays plaintiff take nothing and that "defendants be 
awarded ... interest as contained in paragraph 7 herein." (R 20) 
Plantiff engaged in extensive discovery resulting in the verified admis-
sion by defendants that they had no evidence of how, when, where, by whom, who 
being present, and for what reason, the alleged alterationwas made. (R 78, 81) 
As plaintiff viewed the law, all questions of material fact had been ad-
mitted. Under Rule 56, plaintiff made a motion for summary judgment. Defend-
ant Youngs made a like motion. (R 166, 110) The trial court entered its order 
denying both motions, stating the burden of proof was on plaintiff. (R 200) 
Plaintiff filed with this court its Petition for Intermediate Appeal undertaking 
to get review of the law question left by reason of the state of the pleadings 
and admissions. (R 204) Plaintiff's request was bottomed on "It is defendant-
respondents that must produce evidence to turn the burden from themselves". 
(R 210) This court declined plaintiff's request, remanding for trial. 
The cause was tried to the court. In a short pre-trial meeting, the 
court reminded that the plaintiff had the burden and would go forward. Plain-
tiff so proceeded. It undertook to explain how the original contract was ne-
gotiated, and its relation to exhibits 2 and 3, the plaintiff and defendants1 
copies of the instrument respectively. 
Banker Mott testified he had taken over management of the escrow bank 
since Meagher's leave, and had been the "custodian of these records." (In-
cluded Ex. 1 and the escrow documents at bar.) Mott was advised "If I told you 
that the defendant has claimed that one of the documents has been forged, you 
would have no knowledge of any action on any document within that file that 
could have been tampered with? A. There would be none that I know of." He 
had been asked if he had any knowledge of any alteration or tampering with any 
of the instruments in the escrow, to which he answered "There should be none 
whatsoever." (Tr 18) 
Banker Meagher testified the litigants had all been at the bank on April 
10, 1972 between the hour of 11 AM to 3 PM (Tr 43); that plaintiff was buying 
and defendants were selling a ranch for which the bank was lending plaintiff 
the $33,000 down payment. (Tr 23, 24) He said the Youngs were anxious to con-
clude the sale. He came and went during this protracted period or negotiations, 
but was finally signaled, told the parties were ready to close. He stated there 
had been a problem to be negotiated, too much money the first year. "... the 
problem was that if they paid the $33,000 and a payment to this Clara Young ... 
another ten or twelve thousand ... would they have the money to pay at this date 
from the operation of the dairy herd. And that was what the Hartmans and the 
Youngs were trying to iron out and agree upon." "I don't remember the details; 
I remember that that was the essence of the discussion and probably the essence 
of the changes." 
Asked how the initials got on the page Meagher said: "we went page-for-
page on the changes that were on each individual page. And they were, apparently, 
all agreed to and their copies were being conformed." (Tr 29) "I said ... it 
looks like we have got things pretty well agreed upon so I commenced to read 
the whole agreement ... I read it word-for-word all of the pages with the 
exception of the one page ... re escrow instructions ... And then I said ... 
Everybody initial this agreement ... These changes ... They initialed it in my 
presence ... we proceeded ... to initial the Young contract and the Hartman 
copies, assuming that they had previously been conformed." He said he did not 
pay attention to the attempt to conform: "I paid attention that they initialed 
them ... because I figured that was the essence of the change that they wanted 
in the agreement ... Everybody shook hands. (Tr 31) Meagher held Exhibit 
1: "Q. So it was notarized there in the presence of everyone? A. I believe 
that's correct ... As far as I know, the documents were completed when I took 
them to make up the escrow." (Tr 32.) 
Meagher examined all pages and indicated his own hand writing which in-
cluded the figures relative to the water stock on page 1 of exhibit 1. There 
was only one water certificate in the room; he was authorized to insert the 
stock numbers later when they were brought into the bank. (Tr 33) As to the 
documents going into escrow, Exhibit 1, the warranty deeds, Bill of sale he 
testified: "They were placed into the file and went into our escrow file in 
the vault of the bank. He testified he wrote on Exhibit 1, page 2 on the 9th 
line from the bottom, the word "November" in his hand but he said the November 
on line 10 from the bottom is not his hand. This was inserted by plaintiff. 
(Tr 68) He said these changes were to conform with the ability of plaintiff 
and his boys to pay the agreement and the bank loan. (Tr 28, 37, 42, 44, 54, 
58, 59) 
Meagher recognized the alteration of the typed "2" to the penned "3" on 
line 21 of Exhibit 1, page 2. "Q. Now when you read that to these parties did 
you read it as 1972 or 1973? A. I would have read it as 1973." (Tr 38) At 
the first anniversary payment due-date he testified how the interest was com-
puted; he wrote in his hand the check, Exhibit 6 (Tr 39), 
On cross examination he testified as to the nature of the long negotiat-
ions preceeding signing: "can they, out of the operations, make the payment on 
the next April the way the contract was drafted. That was what the discussion 
was about from in the morning until ... 2:30 in the afternoon when we sat down 
to conclude the agreement. (Tr 42) "Q. Mow do you specifically recall read-
ing the page numbered 2 of this agreement, the original copy ... A. Yes sir, I 
read from that ... So I assume that the change of the '72 to the '73 was there 
and read properly. I read the agreement in detail with every change that was 
on the page ... (Tr 44) 
The crux of the fact problem occurred for the trial court when counsel for 
defendants asked the banker: "You assume that, but you do not know that for a 
fact? You cannot recall, when you read it, if that change existed? A. That 
is a pretty pungent question. I don't recall for sure on it; I would rather 
say that it was most assuredly there. Q. You don't recall it being three, 
however? A. No, sir, I don't." (Tr 45) In giving consideration to this testi-
mony, be it recalled that the date of the transaction being remembered was April 
10, 1972. The bank had 2000 escrow matters. (Tr 51) 
At the close of the case and before argument, the court invited the parties 
to submitted written memorandums; and in connection therewith, the following 
important colloquy occurred: "Mr. Lamoreaux: Is it possible at this juncture 
...to say who the laboring are? (meaning who has the laboring oar;). 
THE COURT. Well, we will assign you the laboror, because you have the burden 
of proof. You will be the first ..." (Tr 153) It is of interest plaintiff was 
given 5 days after receipt of defendants memo to respond. The record will show 
that the decision of the trial court was out before the five days were up! 
Plaintiff was deprived of his right to try to rebut. (Tr 355, 366, 381) 
AHUUHENT 
POINT ONE 
I. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING'TO FIND THE INTEREST ACCRUAL 
DATE RESULTED FROM AGREEMENT.
 : 
A careful examination of the change on line 21 page two on exhibits one 
and two is in order. In the original, there are three colors of ink on the 
page. Meagher explained his special color of blue. (Tr 58) He wrote or 
printed the NOVEMBER on line 9 from the bottom. (Tr 36) It is clear from all 
the testimony that David Sam wrote in his hand most of the changes, interliniat-
ions in Exhibit 1. (Tr 145) Defendants in answer to Interrogatories have 
Question 
identified each hand written entry as to the hand that wrote it. (R 86, Q/l5) 
The black color of his ink is obvious. The initials of plaintiff show together 
with the "November" on line 10 from the bottom a dark blue color of ink, dif-
ferent from Meagher and different from Sam. These were written by plaintiff 
he testified. (Tr 69) Turn to the same page and lines on Exhibit 2, plaintiff's 
own working copy which he was attempting to conform. Everything in Exhibit 2 
except defendants initials, signature and acknowledgment are in the hand of 
plaintiff. (And excepting the $22,921 on page 5 of the original.) Meagher tes-
tified he added that, including the word "or". (Tr29 ) On defendants copy, 
Ex. 3 the $22,921 seems to be in the hand of plaintiff but Meagher took the 
credit for writing the rest of the initialed text on page 5 of exhibits 3. 
FISHER was carefully examined on the change from 1972 to 1973. He said 
it was hard to remember. He stated that the original "was changed, but I don't 
know who changed it. David Sam would be the guy that held the copy to make the 
change He was filling it in. That is all I can say because I was sitting 
to the side of Bruce and he was going through his contract ... and he was fill-
ing it in." (Tr 114) Fisher testified the "Youngs accented or agreed that 
the interest would not begin to accrue until 1973." (Tr 115) Fisher made it 
clear that "with this much money that our interest wouldn't start until next 
year ... I probably don't remember what I said ... my father-in-law ... was 
doing it for us." Fisher testified as to the instant change the Youngs "didn't 
feel like that was exactly right ... to their favor ... She didn't think was 
right." Fisher said Meagher was present during these discussions. (Tr 119) 
Young's counsel asked Fisher respecting the change on Exhibit 1: "Did you see 
this done? A. No, I can't say as I seen the "3" changed. But I sat ... I 
seen it all done. They was writing on the pages. I v/as sitting there at the 
table watching, but I never watched what they were writing down ... Well I seen 
that Bruce Hartman had a copy and Youngs had a copy, and David Sam had a copy. 
And they went down through the copies and read them through and they changed 
them, what had to be changed on each copy ... Each one of them signed the pages 
on these copies ... Q. If I showed you Exhibit 2, could you say that you saw 
Bruce write the change on Line21,the '72 to '73? A. Yes ... I sat right to 
the side of him and watched every bit of this filled in. Q. I think you said 
as to Exhibit 1 that you didn't specifically see anyone change anything on Line 
21 of Exhibit 1? A. I don't kffow whose copy that is ... That is the original. 
Did you see that change made specifically? A. The only change I saw made was 
the one that was next to me and that was Bruce. Q. So you did see Bruce change 
his copy? A. Yes. Q. Did you watch what the Youngs were doing on their copy? 
A. No, I didn't ... I never." (Tr 119, 120) 
The plaintiff wrote with a color not to be confused. Notice the color 
and character of the "3" on line 21 of Exhibit 2, his own copy. Please examine 
the same "3" on Exhibit 1: There is a very clear difference. Plaintiff's is 
clean. The change on Exhibit 1 is heavy; it would appear it is larger, and has 
(Hoto, C$el the reverse nide of the sheet.) 
been retraced two or three times./ We have examined these changes under a large 
magnifying glass at the Salt Lake Public Library. We invite this court to do 
likewise. 
The 23 year old son of plaintiff RANDY HARTMAN saw and heard everything, 
but his memory was somewhat lacking after three years. He testified Sam held 
the original, "controlling document'1, his father a carbon and the Youngs a 
carbon. 
"Sam, he started reading it. And as we came along to these 
lines ... that had to be changed ... yes the blanks. Well 
they would be filled in and each one of us. Dad would fill 
it in on his copy, and the Youngs would fill in on their copy, 
and then if that was all right, then it was initialed." 
He couldn't "really say for sure whether it", the change of the interest 
accrual date was discussed. He knew there "was a little argument between Dad 
and Alma ... the date when the interest was to start." He testified Sam was 
there when the document was initialed but not when it was finally signed. (Tr 104) 
Then: "At that time Dad wrote it on his copy and Alma and Lawrence wrote it on 
their copy, and David passed the other copy around and they each initialed it." 
Asked if he remembered the "pen inter!iniations?, Do you understand that big 
i 
word ... Well it's a little too far back. I can remember the writing going on, 
but I can't remember this ... I can remember the initialing." (Tr 106) 
[PLAINTIFF'S VERSION::* , ' . 
Mr. Sam had the contract there with him and he gave us each 
a copy and we proceeded to discuss the contract right there 
at the table. (Tr 62) Sam started to read the contract to 
us as we went through it." Plaintiff held a copy. As to 
Exhibit 2, "Well this was the copy that was given to me and 
|I took it and had it recorded Exhibit 2, yes. My copy 
was there ... David gave each one of us a copy ... I think 
David Sam had the original copy and was reading from it. 
• |... those blank spaces filled in ... they were filled in at 
that time.' 
Plaintiff then identifies the places he himself writes, filled in. He wrote 
everything on page 2 of Exhibit 2 except the Young's initials. Asked why the 
initialing on page 2 he stated, 
"Well, after our discussion we agreed on these changes. And 
we initialed all the changes that was made on that page. 
'• L... We filled in all the blanks that were there, and we were 
asked to initial those changes and this is what we did." (Tr 66)-r , 
Plaintiff acknowledged his writing "November" at line 24 on page 2 of the 
original. (Tr 68, 69) and also wrote the same November on the Youngs' copy, 
(Tr 70) and initialed. He could not account for other writing on page 2 of the 
original, but he positively testified "all of this writing was done at the bank 
on that same date." (Tr 70) Plaintiff held at this moment in the trial Exhibit 
1 and was asked how the 1972 to 1973 alteration occurred, to which he responded: 
"David Sam had this copy in his possession. I assume he did. 
I assumed David made the change. I assumed that he made the 
change. I didn't make the change ... Was it that way when 
you initialed it? A. Yes, sir ... I assumed we were initial-
ing all of the changes on that page. (Tr 70) 
He further identifies his hand on all exhibits and it appears he takes the re-
sponsibility for all hand writing on his own copy except the $22,921 on page 5 
of his own text. (Tr 71-73) and defendants' initials, signatures. The signing 
and initialing was done in the presence of all parties except Sam who had gone 
he thought by the time of signing. Meagher was also present. (Tr 74) 
On cross, plaintiff again testified he did not know who changed the 2 to 
3 on the original contract. (Tr 85) But he was sure he had made that identical 
change on his own copy. In the area of financial concessions, plaintiff testi-
fied: "But they agreed that we would forestall payment on the $68,000 and the 
interest wasn't to accrue until '73 ... they would also forego one year's in-
terest? A. Well, that is what we agreed upon there." Asked who held Exhibit 1 
at the time the change was made: "Well, either Mr. Meagher or Mr. Sam, I think. 
Now I don't know just when David Sam left. But it was one of those two gentle-
men that had the copy at the time that they was reading it to us and when we was 
making the changes. I think it was Mr. Meagher because he read it back to us. 
I recall twice that he read the contract back to us, we were holding our own 
copies." (Tr 86) Plaintiff was not sure about how long Sam was present but was 
satisfied he had left by the signing time. Plaintiff acknowledged he had made 
the change from 1972 to 1973 on his own copy." "It was done at the table 
there in the office when we all set there together ... I was aware of that when 
we done it in the bank ... Q. Now concerning the change, was there a discussion 
about that? A. At the bank there was. Before we signed that contract, there 
was. I said (to Lawrence and Alma) if we had to carry the interest and the first 
payment on that first year, we couldn't buy it that way ... we discussed the fact 
that we couldn't pack it." As to the participation of the boys: "...they did 
make a comment that we couldn't pack the interest and pack all that principle 
the first time and the initial payment, that we would have to forestall it." 
(Tr 94) "I think the discussion was among Lawrence and Alma and all of us there 
at the table ..." As to the response from defendants plaintiff testified "I 
think at first they commented that they wanted it (the interest). But we said 
we couldn't pack that load." (Tr 95) 
Finally, plaintiff was asked: 
"... you stated a condition of your purchase that the in-
terest not begin to accrue until the date it shows in Ex-
hibit 1? A. That's right. Q. Now did the Youngs hear 
you make that demand? A. Yes. It was discussed there at 
the table ... It was discussed there at the table and we did 
talk about it, and it was changed. Q. And it was changed 
in their presence and in your presence? A. Yes. It was 
changed there when we all signed that document. That had 
been changed, because we discussed that along with all 
these other items. Q. And did they agree to that change? 
A. Yes, they did. They didn't object. They went along 
with it. Q. And someone wrote it on Exhibit 1? A. Yes 
... I don't know who wrote it in. As I say, I don't know 
who had the original. I think David Sam had the original 
but I don't know for sure who had it." (Tr 98, 99) 
Turning to MEAGHER'S version, he testified the Youngs were anxious to sell, 
needed a large down payment so they could go into business in Southern Utah. 
(Tr 20-24) All the parties came to the bank, 
"... their minds were not completely in accord at that partic-
ular time ... ITef t ... I returned ... they still had some 
items to work out as to the payment and the time of payment... 
they had the agreements, ostensibly, the way they wanted them. 
There were three agreements on my desk . .• Mr. Hartman was 
sitting at my right ... They said that they had ironed 
out things pretty well ... we proceeded to execute the 
agreement. (Tr 25) ... I had one in my hand, and it 
didn't appear to be the original. I asked them for the 
original copy ... and we did each have a copy at that 
time and I had the original ... We started on page 1 and 
mutually agreed on everything on that agreement, which 
was the original, and they were to mark their individual 
deals to conform with the original contract that we 
marked with the details that were mutually agreed upon 
... They marked their own copies ... Exhibit 1 ... I 
would say this is the contract that I held in my hand 
which is the original of the three agreements that were 
on the desk ... we proceeded for every change ... on the 
agreement". (Tr 26) "The next deal is that we came to 
page 2, and page 2 was modified and agreed upon." He 
did not participate "too much" but showed the back ground 
of the problem, discussion. "There was some discussion 
that carried over at the time that these modifications 
were made. (We will not repeat his version of the dis-
cussion, the "meat" of the problems. He certainly was 
capable of, and got the "essence of the discussion, and 
probably the essence of the changes." (Tr 29) Had he 
not better, when he was lending $33,000 to plaintiff for 
the down payment?" (Tr 24) "We went page for page on 
the changes that were on each individual page. And they 
were apparently all agreed to, and their copies were be-
ing conformed." (Tr 29) "I commenced to read the whole 
agreement." ... and I read it word-for-word all the pages 
... (Tr 30) Then he said "Everybody initial this agreement." 
"This document was given to Mr. .. Hartman, then to Mr. 
Young, and then to Mrs. Young to initial on page 2 and 
page 5 ... They initialed it in my presence ... then we 
proceeded ... to initial the Young contract and the Hart-
man copies, assuming that they had previously been con-
formed ... I paid attention that they initialed them." 
He did not pay attention to their conformation, only 
their initialing "Because I figured that was the essence 
of the change that they wanted in the agreement ... Then 
everybody shook hands ... They signed and copies went to 
... be notarized ... there in the presence of everyone." 
The documents were completed when I took them to make up 
the escrow. (Tr 31, 32) 
At various places, he identifies his hand writing. His hand writing ap-
pears on page 2 of exhibit 1 in writing, printing "November" nine lines from the 
bottom, but no more. (Tr 36) He did not write the water stock numbers on any 
copy but on the face of Exhibit 1 later. (Tr 27) 
He testified he put the original and the "ancillary documents" into "the 
file and went into our escrow file in the vault of the bank." (Tr 36) He was 
asked "...can you say that Exhibit 1, as you see it today is in 
precisely the same text and condition as it was on the 
date it was executed and initialed ... A. I have no 
hesitance about saying that I read that agreement to make 
it conform, and that that is the original agreement that 
was modified to conclude the transaction. Q. Please look 
at page 2 of Exhibit 1 on line 21, there is an alteration 
in pen of the year when interest will accrue ... A. I 
would have read it as 1973." (Tr 37, 38) 
Meagher computed the interest payment the following November 18, 1973 and wrote 
the check for the appropriate amount as reflected from Exhibit 1, plaintiff sign-
ing the check, handing it to Meagher for distribution according to the escrow. 
(Tr 39, Ex 6) We will not attempt to analyze the cross examination. The court's 
"Decision" states respecting the Meagher testimony: 
"... the most that could be claimed for Mr. Meagher's 
testimony would be that when he read the agreement to 
the parties he thinks that the altered date was on the 
document although he admitted he does not have a memory 
on that particular point." He further indicated that he 
had no memory of particular discussions." (R 380) 
Please examine the Request for Admissions to the bank 
and Meagher; they were not answered and are deemed ad-
mitted. He knew this as did his counsel. Also 
Meagher's affidavit. (R 37, 75) 
If this were simply a law case, the court's view of the testimony might be the 
end of this appeal; but it is an equity matter, and this court is entitled to 
view de nova the entire thrust of Mr. Meagher's experienced view. We must modestly 
state that the court's view does not represent any preponderence of the testi-
mony; it is narrow and restricted; gives no credence to the long experience of 
this fine banker, lawyer. If plaintiff must carry the full burden of proof then 
because of poor memories of events 3^ years p r i o r ) , 
we could be "dead"/but the trial court has been in error from the outset. A 
better view of the law of the case improves the strength of the testimony quoted 
in this section of this brief. And in the light of such testimony, the color of 
the inks and the "hand" writing on the exhibits take on a different aspect. It 
requires more than "the subject was never discussed" to explain how the heavy 
writing appears in the "3" on page 2 of Exhibit one, as against the different 
color plaintiff employed in conforming his own copy. The ink color of the al-
teration is the same as Sam's writing. Then a new "scienter" comes into focus 
in the failure of the Youngs to "conform" their copy; they did not like the 
change. How natural for them, Mrs. Young, to refrain from reflecting the change! 
Let us look at DEFENDANTS' TESTIMONY on the same subject: it is believed 
there is no conflict in the testimony except the wholesale expression of Mr. and 
Mrs. Young that the subject of the date of the interest accrual "was never dis-
cussed." Mr. Young did not know who had written in his copy on line 15 of page 
2 the penmanship to be viewed. (Tr 126) He did identify his wife's writing 
the 'Aprils'. He testified there was no change "on your copy following the 
second "10 day of April"? Is there any alteration of the typewritten figure 
•1972'? A. No there isn't." He was then asked "Did you have any discussion of 
changing "1972" to "1973" ... A. No sir, it was never mentioned. It wasn't 
even thought of in any way, whatsoever." (Tr 126) On page 127 he said no dis-
cussion whatsoever on the subject; and closes his testimony of no assent to the 
change. On cross he states he has no knowledge as to how to explain the instant 
change. (Tr 131) Even the court said "he does not know how that got there." 
(Tr 132) 
Not a big point, but it is interesting that Mr. Young had not initialed in 
all places but his wife "Alma" had done it for him. (Tr 134, 135) As we end 
Mr. Youngs testimony, is there a true conflict in the testimony? Or what may 
we call it? He has not said Plaintiff, Mr. Meagher or the boys were telling un-
truths except to state "There was no discussion whatsoever" of this important 
subject. Let this court take notice, and it may be technical, that there had to 
be "some" discussion to fill in the blanks on line 21 of page 2 of all exhibits, 
In order that the month and date should be agreed upon and inserted. Just how 
much discussion could be had on that limited but important subject and none on 
the year is disquieting. 
MRS. YOUNG, who is now "an owner in the Bumbleberry business:" She was 
at the bank. (Tr 136) All persons at the table had a copy. Again, like her 
husband, there was "none whatsoever" discussion of the change from 1972 to 1973. 
It is unbelievable that the day and the month could be inserted without dis-
cussion; and two copies in evidence bear the "material alteration" of 1972 to 
1973. And they say there was no discussion! She said she was "frightened", 
and maybe this was the reason. 
DAVID SAM: testified he didn't get there until 2:30 or 3 PM, and "they 
were finalizing a sale of property to Mr. Hartman." (Tr 144) He had prepared 
the agreement. He then identifies the changes on Exhibit 1 he made. He admitted 
the handwriting of "31 day of Dec" on line 15 of Exhibit 1, page 2. This is im-
portant for it is the only place we have a "3" in Sam's hand to be compared with 
the "3" at line 21. He wrote the "18" on line 24 and the same "18" on the line 
below. We will not detail the other changes. From here on his testiirony is 
generally "qualified"; his answers are rarely positive. His comment at page 148 
about the "reluctance" of the Youngs can reach into space ... For him to state 
"I recall no conversation" does not state there was none concerning the crux of 
the plaintiff's prima facie case. He had been present for only a small fraction 
of the time the parties negotiated. Asked to account for the change, he said, 
"I don't know.1" He generously testified that people do not always remember im-
portant events. He spent between a half and a full hour in the conference. (Tr 151) 
To what extent is there a true conflict in the evidence, so that in a case 
at law, the court would not "weigh" the evidence? Is this not sufficiently 
an equity case, or is not the conflict so "mooted" that the court "need not ac-
cord any favored position to the trial court"? 
One view of the case is that it may be regarded so "close" that a proper 
utilization of "presumptions" and burden of proof will make it fit for disposition 
fa A r a b l e to plaintiff. 
POINT TWU 
II. THE COURT ERRED IN PLACING THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON PLAINTIFF. IN A 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION; THE BURDEN SHIFTED TO DEFENDANTS. 
The issues at the trial and before this court are not of fact but of law. 
The motions for summary judgment made by each side pointed up that Rule 56 could 
have quickly disposed of the questions without trial. This court held in OIL 
SHALE CORP. v LARSON, UJQP2 540: 
Ordinarily, under the statute (Declaratory Judgment Act) 
the instrument under which someone wishes to have the court 
resolve doubts arising from the language used, is simply a^  
matter of law to be decided by the court from the wording 
thereof. 
The same statute was used by plaintiff in the case at bar. All issues of 
fact vanished quickly by reason of the affirmative defense pleaded by defendant 
and the discovery which showed defendants had no evidence of what they were 
claiming. (R 81) 
The honorable trial court has, from the beginning, misconceived the law 
of this case. Early on, it ruled in a Declaratory Judgment Action that the 
burden of proof was on plaintiff, this in the face of a fully executed, verified 
contract, laying in escrow at a respectful bank, with defendants alleging an 
affirmative defense that the instrument had been changed, "altered ... contrary 
to defendants knowledge or permission". 
Plaintiff had the initial burden of making a prima facie case. This it 
accomplished, for the trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss (Tr 121) 
when plaintiff rested. Clearly a prima facie case had been established that 
Exhibit 1 had been agreed to between the parties. There had been about 25 
changes, additions, interliniations. The controversy concerned but one issue: 
the only change defendants disputed was that on page 2 at line 21, changing the 
1972 to 1973. Said contract had been initialed on pages 2 and 5 and was ad-
mittedly signed and verified at the same time and place, escrowed. In their 
pleadings and at the trial, defendants admitted execution. They entered in 
the pleadings and at the trial the affirmative defense of a single change that 
they did not agree to. The court must make some finding, based on competent 
evidence, as to the initial burden, and the subsequent burden of "going forward" 
as a result of plaintiff meeting the initial burden. No such finding appears, 
only the naked expression that "plaintiff had the burden of establishing that 
the alteration ... was authorized and assented to by all of the parties ..." 
(R 200, Tr 153) 
Clearly we here deal with an alteration, obvious on its face. But that 
contract, Exhibit 1 was admitted as to initialing, execution and verification, 
together with depositing in escrow at the bank. (Tr 46, 74, 86, 94, 98, 104, 
113, 114, 116, 129, 140, 147) But the law of verification gives rise to an 
element of presumption of validity, assent and genuineness, never conjured with 
here. When defendants alleged their affirmative defense of "the original copy 
was altered ... contrary to defendants knowledge or permission" some burden 
shifted to them, of which the court was silent. Defendants had no evidence to 
back up their defense. They had allegation, suspicion and inference, which the 
trial court accepted instead of requiring solid proof, in the face of the prima 
facie case made by plaintiff. 
The court should have adverted to the Utah Supreme Court doctrine of he 
would would assault a regularly acknowledged deed or contract must do so with 
evidence, clear and convincing. The ancient Pennsylvania case of COVER AND WIFE 
v MANAWAY, 8 A. 393, 1887, deals with a deed in the hands of the grantee which 
is assaulted by a grantor with claim that it has been changed. The attack 
amounted to a claim of fraud, forgery, against which the court raised a con-
clusive presumption of genuineness. The attacker must establish the alteration 
not with "vague and unsatisfactory" evidence but with something "sufficiently 
explicit in its character to fairly rebut the presumption which the law raises 
as to due execution ... and acknowledgment." Because the Utah high court has 
adopted and repeated the "clear and convincing" rule, we have reached back to 
find early origins thereof. 
Had defendants not alleged an affirmative defense, but simply denied 
Exhibit 1 was their instrument, the burden might have lain throughout on 
plaintiff. But they chose to negate the instrument as a fraud, a forgery. 
Counsel for defendants in argument of their motion for summary judgment sug-
gested their theory of the change as "trickery", and cited cases treating the 
claimed change as a "forgery". ( H 158, 167) At the trial, plaintiff asked 
the court to call the change by its right, claimed name, that of a forgery. 
Defendant's counsel did not like this. (Tr 131, 132). Defendant was asked on 
cross examination: "Do you believe it is a forgery?" Objection raised. Then 
plaintiff's counsel said "I want him to face up to the ultimate question here." 
The witness was allowed to answer "It was changed. That is all that I know. I 
don't know." (Tr 131, 132) It is doubly interesting to note how defendants 
argue on their motion for summary judgment raising the serious question that 
the change was made before signature. ('R 158, 167) They didn't know then, nor 
at the trial whether the alleged alteration was made before or after signature. 
To this day they do not know. HUNDLEY v NEELEY 365 P2 196 (Wyo 1961) is il-
luminitive on this matter. 3A. C.J.S. 269 The motion of plaintiff for summary 
judgment should have been granted. The court's error may reach clear back to 
that moment and the argument made is still illuminative. 
Plaintiff believes that in the face of the evidence, the attack made must 
be regarded as a claimed forgery. It is defendants position that the change 
was not authorized, yet their signatures attach to the completed instrument, 
verified. They want their cake and have eaten it. They have collected all but 
the money deposited in court. They have taken the money and invested it into 
Bumbleberry. They find their own copy was not altered, yet initialed by all 
parties. It is a wind fall when they need money. They have yielded to the 
temptation to forget the subject was discussed and reluctantly agreed to, for 
it is worth $4100 of cash to them. 
They cannot escape calling the alleged change a forgery. But they admitted 
at the trial and also in their discovery, that they cannot state when, where, 
by whom, how, or for what reason, the change, the forgery was accomplished. 
In adverting to the record on these admissions, please be aware that David Sam, 
their attorney testified as follows regarding the changes on page 2 of Exhibit 1: 
Well, I do remember some conversation about the change 
on page 2. I don't remember the exact nature of the 
conversation. I do remember that the Youngs were some-
what reluctant, as I recall, to make any change on the 
contract and rather reluctantly made this change on 
page 2. That is, changing "January" to "November." 
The court may have its own present interpretation on the true meaning of 
the above; it could conclude that the last six words were put in to save some-
thing. Sam did not say there was no conversation on the instant subject. He 
said "I recall no conversation regarding this." (Tr 148) The Youngs testimony 
that there was no conversation and that they did not agree to the change are at 
Tr 126, 127. That they do not know how, when, where, by whom, who was present, 
and for what reason is found at Tr 131, 132, 138, 139, 143. See answers to 
Interrogatories where they admitted they had no "hard" evidence on the subject, 
R 95. "Defendants make no allegations as to the authorship of the unauthorized 
change". (R 98) On the same page defendants state: "This is the only item in 
Exhibit "A" to which defendants take exception." Thus the issue is narrowed. 
Thus they must fail, COVER v MANAWAY, supra. That is a substantial land mark 
case as it discusses "vague and unsatisfactory" evidence in a claimed forgery, 
alteration. 
(iPI ease refer back to page 3_ herein for an inumeration of the defenses 
pleaded by defendants.) 
The trial court treated plaintiff as in the ordinary suit putting the 
burden on the first mover. It failed to observe the admission of execution of 
Exhibit 1 and the new matter pleaded, the latter clearly shifting the burden at 
least of going forward with the evidence;onto defendants. When defendants con-
firmed in the testimony what they had admitted in the discovery, that they had 
no evidence of when, where, how, by whom, who was present and for what reason 
the alleged alteration was made, the case moved from one of establishing further 
fact to one of law. At this turn of the case, it is not one of weighing evi-
dence. As was found by this court in MAKOFF v MAKOFF, 528 P2d 797, in law, 
"there is no disputed issue of fact, and since there is merely an issue of law, 
we need not accord any favored position to the trial court." All of the trial 
at Vernal scarcely added any new fact ingredient not admitted in the pleadings 
and discovery. At this point the case must be viewed without the evidence 
taken at trial other than confirmation that defendant had no evidence of alte-
ration; only suspicion. 
A true, lawful determination of where the burden of proof lay will simp-
lify disposition of this appeal and lay down the sound law this court should 
be identified with. The trial court's error was in it's application of famil-
iar procedural methods without a careful analysis of the true nature of the 
inquiry set up by the complaint for declaratory judgment, and the affirmative 
defense interposed. The Iowa court in HAGAN v MERCHANTS & BANK 46 NW 1114, 
1890 held: "If from the fact of alteration, it may not be presumed that it 
was made after delivery and without authority, then surely the burden of so 
proving is upon him who alleges it." 
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DECLARATORY JUDGMENT: BURDEN OF PROOF. 
The foundation case, pointing up the law of the issue at bar is TRAVELERS' 
INSURANCE v GREENOUGH, 190 A. 129, 109 ALR 1096, 1937. It was a "Petition for 
declaratory judgment brought by an insurer to determine whether its motor ve-
hicle liability policy furnished coverage for a certain accident. Action at 
law for injuries arising out of the accident are pending, and the insurer seeks 
adjudication of the question of coverage in order that it may know whether it 
has a duty to defend the actions, the policy requiring it to do so if coverage 
for the accident exists. Its liability depends upon the issue whether the 
person driving the vehicle at the time of the accident was using it with the 
named assured's consent. On trial of the issue the court found the evidence 
evenly balanced and, ruling that the burden of proof rested upon the plaintiff 
insurer, held that it indemnified against liability for the accident. A further 
holding of liability was made inasmuch as it may be a matter of law." The New 
Hampshire high court reversed and started the procession of law this court 
should adopt. 
Keeping in mind the dilema defendant-respondent Youngs put plaintiff in 
with the default letter Exhibit 10 here, note what the court stated: 
In respect to the burden of proof "When an insurer desires 
to raise the question whether the liability charged is one 
covered by the policy, it should be done seasonably, and in 
any event, before the plaintiff has been prejudiced by the 
delay. Ordinarily ... the issue is one calling for prelim-
inary presentation, so that the insurer's rights or duty 
to defend the action for negligence may be first determined 
... The Declaratory Judgment Act ... provides a convenient 
procedure for determining such a question ... 'The effect 
of the act' is simply to make a controversy over a legal 
or equitable right or title justifiable at an earlier state 
of the controversy than that which gave rise to a cause of 
action at common law, or to enable the normal defendant to 
institute the proceedings. It makes no difference whether 
the claim be in positive or negative form, or whether it in-
volves issues of fact .. Claim of legal or equitable right 
on the one hand and its denial on behalf of an adverse in-
terest constitute a cause for proceeding for a declaratory 
judgment ... Prevention not merely of threatened wrongs 
but prevention of uncertainty and misunderstanding in the 
assertion of rights.' 
If the proceedingtodetermine the insurer's liability were 
one brought against it, the general burden of proof would 
rest upon its adversary. It would be on the defensive, and 
a case against it would require a balance of proof to warrant 
a judgment against it. It is no less on the defensive here. 
Whatever the form of the proceeding, and notwithstanding its 
nominal position as a plaintiff, the real situation is that 
it is defending against a claim of its liability. The relief 
it seeks is primarily to have the claim adjudicated. Its po-
sition that the claim is without merit is necessary, in order 
to show that the claim is a controverted one. By instituting 
the litigation it compels the claimant to take action in as-
sertion of his claim. He is required to establish it to en-
title it to validity. The plaintiff does not prevail unless 
the claim is defeated, but the claim is defeated if it is not 
proved, and it is for the claimant to furnish the proof. 
This view is thought to be just and fair. A contrary one would 
place the plaintiff in a position of undue disadvantage. 
Having the right to an adjudication of the claim without 
waiting for the claimant to institute legal proceedings, it 
ought not to suffer and to have to pay a price by exercising 
its right. No commendation of justice is perceived in making 
the plaintiff worse off by seeking a disposal of the content-
ions betv/een it and the claimant than by awaiting litigation 
commenced by the latter ... 
Burden of proof is not imposed according to priority in 
taking legal steps to determine issues. And the Declaratory 
Judgment Act ... discloses no purpose to shift the burden 
upon a party merely because he avails himself of the act ... 
Here redress is not sought except in the sense of relief from 
uncertainty. The right to have a disputed claim adjudicated 
does not predicate a duty to prove the claim unfounded ... 
There is no strict and rigid rule that the primary burden of 
proof is on the party who brings suit. (Emphasis added) 
In the case at bar note that plaintiff did not "come out swinging", but 
declared he was "anxious to avoid default" created by Exhibit "B" which is the 
default letter, Exhibit 10, (R 14 a) Plaintiff put itself in exactly the same 
position as the insurer in the Travelers case, supra. It declared on the 
signed, initialed, verified and escrowed contract asking instruction. It was 
the Youngs who became the true "actors", the adversary, the confessors who 
turned up the defense of avoidance, alteration. 
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Fifteen years later, another insurer was faced in Connecticut with a like 
problem: it had written the policy on the dealer-garage vehicles. Defendant 
LaBier took the vehicle home and returning next morning had an accident, strik-
ing Grasso. Grasso, LaBier and the garage owner all claimed the policy covered 
the accident. The insurer interpleaded these three in a Declaratory Judgment 
action. It became known that LaBier had taken title to the car he was driving. 
At issue was whether the car involved was within or without the policy. Plain-
tiff in bringing the action had alleged the garage did not own the vehicle and 
that LaBier was not on garage business at the time of the accident. The trial 
court found the "evidence conflicting, unsatisfactory and finally settled it 
through the medium of the burden of proof, that defendants have failed to estab-
lish by a fair preponderence of the evidence that ownership of the car was in 
Ostop, the garage.11 It found "LaBier was on his way to work and not on any 
business for the garage..." The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court, elab-
orating that because of the contradictory state of the testimony it was "cer-
tainly not convincing" of Ostop's (the garage's) ownership. The balanced 
decision of lack of proof was therefore a very honest representation of the 
judicial mind which we accept in our ensuing discussion." The court then re-
viewed the law of burden of proof in declaratory actions holding that in the 
issue there tried, the ultimate burden of proof rested on the insured to prove 
he was within the policy. PREFERRED ACCIDENT INS. v GRASSO, 186 F2d 987; 23 
ALR 2d 1234. It stated that had "Grasso or Ostop (the garage owner) brought 
the action there would be no doubt but that the burden would have fallen on 
them." The court refers to Borchard, Declaratory Judgments for authority 
backing up its decision; also to TRAVELERS INS. CO. v GREENOUGH, supra. 
The utilization of Declaratory Judgment procedure to test the liability 
of an insurer ahead of the actual suit on the policy is not foreign to this 
?M 
court. It has often utilized the same procedures as in TRAVELERS v GREENOUGH, 
supra, and the above Grasso case, along with others cited herein. In STATE 
FARM MUTUAL v HOLT, 503 P2d 1205, Utah, and in a later case between the same 
parties at 531 P2d 495 the declaratory judgment act was well used to determine 
matters preliminary to the coersive suit to pay money. The court quotes Bor-
chard as do the cases cited in our brief to show the versitility of that act. 
We find no authority contrary to those cases and Borchard on burden of proof. 
MAIN PARKING MALL v SALT LAKE CITY, etc. Utah 1975; 531 P2 866. 
The 2nd Circuit cites an 8th CCA case of RELIANCE LIFE INSURANCE CO. v 
BURGESS, 112 F2d 234, Cert, denied 311 US 699, decided in 1940. This was a 
similar declaratory judgment action instituted by the insurer which adjudicated 
the non-liability of the plaintiff under the construction of the insurance pol-
icy. The issue was how decedent had died, there being evidence of sanity and 
suicide. Was the death by accidental means? At the outset of the trial the 
issue of burden of proof was declared to be on plaintiff insurer; this caused 
the appeal court to reverse with an excellent discussion on the subject at bar. 
The question as to who must sustain the burden of proof in 
a declaratory judgment suit is a comparatively new one, 
which we think does not admit of a categorical answer. It 
must depend ... upon the condition of the pleadings and 
the character of the issues at the time the question is 
presented. Plaintiff alleged that the insured committed 
suicide while sane. It alleged an actual controversy, and 
the proceeding was instituted by it to determine that 
controversy. Defendants denied that a justicible contro-
versy existed and put in issue the allegations of plain-
tiff's petition, but they asked no affirmative relief. 
The question as to whether the burden of proof in its pri-
mary sense rests upon the plaintiff or defendant is ordin-
arily to be determined by ascertaining from the pleadings 
which of the parties without evidence would be compelled to 
subrnit to an adverse judgment before the introduction of any 
evidence, ft is"a fundamental rule that the burden of proof 
in its primary sense rests upon the party who, as deter-
mined by the pleadings, asserts the affirmative of an issue 
and it remains there until the termination of the action. 
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IL. i s_ Qener a JIJXJJPP. n_... ihe^arty who wi 11 be defeated i f no 
evidence relating to the issue is given on either" sideTTi 
In the cited case before any evidence came in, the court had ruled, as in the 
case at bar, that the burden was on plaintiff. Note the plea there was general 
denial, non est factum in effect. There had been no assertion of an affirma-
tive defense or prayer for relief. 
The court could not have anticipated that they would do so, 
(seek affirmative relief) and hence the ruling when made was 
correct. Whether the acts of defendants during the course 
of the trial may have shifted the burden of going forward 
with the evidence remains to be considered ... During the 
course of the trial defendants offered evidence in support 
of their right to recover on the policies. When they thus 
became the actors the burden of proof in its secondary sense^ 
the obligation of going forward with the evidence,shifted to 
them and they were obliged to meet with evidence the prima 
facie case created against them. [Emphasis added) 
Because of the ruling of the Vernal court on the motions for summary judgment 
(that the burden was on plaintiff R 200) and the requirement that plaintiff go 
forward at the trial, plaintiff undertook to establish the basic facts of the 
negotiations, the execution of Exhibit 1 and the attempt to conform Exhibits 2 
and 3 (which was incomplete). A careful comparison of these exhibits will so 
reveal. Plaintiff was under the necessity at the order of the trial court to 
go forward, which meant, to make a prima facie case if it could. Under other 
law and cases to be adverted to, where there is an alteration clear on its face, 
some cases require plaintiff to explain why and how the alteration occurred. 
This plaintiff undertook to do. Had it failed, the court would have granted 
defendants' motion at the point where plaintiff rested. The court denied their 
motion. In defendants' motion he said: "... that the plaintiff has not even 
made a prima facie case. They have not met the burden required in the ruling 
of this court on the 31st of January of this year." (Tr 121, R 200) Hence, it 
is compelling that what ever burden had fallen upon plaintiff had been vindi-
cated. The burden of at least going forward with the evidence was now upon 
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defendants. Remember: they had elaborately pleaded affirmatively. (See page 
3 of this brief.) Plaintiff here was in a better position than the insur-
ance company in RELIANCE v BURGESS, supra because of the affirmative defenses 
pleaded, as well as admission of execution of the instrument, Exhibit 1. 
Let this court "ascertain from the pleadings" who had the burden. The 
court erred in holding it to be on plaintiff. It clung to its error through 
to the end of the case, the submission of the briefs, and the signing of the 
findings, including its "memorandum decision". (R 379, 390; Tr 153) From the 
outset, plaintiff was put in a "position of undue disadvantage" as declared by 
the New Hampshire court in TRAVELERS' INSURANCE v GREENOUGH, supra. Plaintiff 
did not allege he was entitled to the deposit; he asked for instruction. But 
defendant asked for it, justifying on its affirmative defenses. This court must 
hold that action did something to the burden of proof. The subject cannot 
longer be ignored. 
The annotation of the subject BURDEN OF PROOF IN ACTION UNDER GENERAL 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTS, 23 ALR 2d 1234 cannot be said to be a surface inquiry. 
It reaches most of the issues involved here. At page 1253 the subhead #8 states 
a rule "BURDEN ON PARTY WHO WOULD LOSE IF NO EVIDENCE WAS SUBMITTED." May we 
suggest this appeal court examine the pleadings under the assumption that "no 
evidence was submitted." Remember please $4100 has been paid into court. This 
was certainly an action on the equitable side. Under the title DEPOSITS IN 
COURT, 26A CJS 471 states: 
The practice of allowing or requiring deposits in court 
prevails not only in courts of equity, where the practice 
seems to have originated, but also in courts of law... 
The same essential text and authorities are cited at 18 CJ at 765. In terms of 
the sub-head at # 8 of the above ALR annotation, "Who would receive an adverse 
judgment if no evidence were submitted"? The court would have to do something 
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with the $4100 of cash in its registry. Without good cause it would clearly be 
an unjust enrichment to give it to defendants on no proof. In ROADSIDE REST v 
LANKERSHIM, 173 P2d 554 at 557 the California Court cited the rule and statute: 
"The party holding the affirmative of the issue must produce the evidence to 
prove it; therefore, the burden of proof lies on the party who would be defeat-
ed if no evidence were given on either side." This was an action for declara-
tory judgment brought by a plaintiff who alleged the altered part of the docu-
ment was specifically genuine. It argued that the alteration was clear, 
apparent, but the time of the change was not material. The quest of the court 
was to find out who had altered, and when. (Is not that the precise question 
before our court at Vernal?) "... the time of alteration and the circumstances 
connected therewith, are of the utmost importance in determining the valadity 
of the alleged modification and the owner's approval thereof." 
In the case at bar the time, circumstances were never alleged, claimed 
nor proved; nor was there a finding on such crucial issue. The alteration was 
never charged by the court to the plaintiff who would be most benefited there-
by. The trial court let it simply dangle in thin unsupported air that because 
Exhibit 3 did not bear the alteration, mistake and inadvertence had put the 
change into Exhibit 1. Under Section III of page 3 this legerdemain cannot be 
upheld. It is without evidence to support it; it is contrary to the evidence. 
It is contrary to law. 
Please advert to the answer of defendants (R 21) page 3 of this brief for 
a full specification of the affirmative defenses. What is the meaning of "was 
altered" and "has been changed" in terms of time? In the definition of the 2nd 
paragraph of the article on "Alteration of Instruments" in 3A Corpus Juris Secun-
dum 269 that authority states: "Technically an alteration of an instrument is a 
change in the instrument by a party thereto or one entitled thereunder or one in 
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privy with such person, after the instrument has been signed or fully executed, 
without the consent of the other party to it ..." It sounds as though defend-
ant Youngs are pleading in terms of a change after execution. Of course this 
is an important inquiry. Clearly it amounts to a forgery, a dastardly act when 
not authorized. Its allegation should not be sustained without satisfactory 
proof of when, where, by whom. When this evidence is unsatisfactory, conflict-
ing, the courts have often covered such dilema by assessing burden of proof; 
hence our emphasis on that matter here. The evidence in the case at bar under 
one view is conflicting. But this court will not skirt the issue by saying it 
will not weigh the evidence. This is an equity case, and this court may and 
should comb all of the evidence to see where the preponderance lays, and where 
it should lay. The basic evidence ofc * Meagher should be believed. His 
pertinent evidence will be found at pages 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 37, 43, 44, 45, 
46, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 59 60 of the transcript. As appellee's attempt to trip 
Mr. Meagher, let it be recalled Sam admitted people forget. (Tr 150) That he 
read the instrument in its entirety to the parties, asked them to initial 
their changes, and then watched them sign, provided the notary public, should 
give rise to a presumption that the change was on the page when initialed, 
executed. To attack this must bring in the doctrines of NORTHCREST v WALKER 
BANK 248 P2d 692, 122 Utah 268, 1952 later adverted to in "clear and convin-
cing evidence" discussion. THAHP v JAMISON, Iowa, 134 NW 583 
Plaintiff believes this to be an equitable action; as such, this review 
court may examine the record de novo. It asked that defendants "be enjoined 
from further harrassing plaintiff and putting him in jeopardy of default." (R 5) 
The default letter, Exhibit 10 put plaintiff in a most inequitable position, 
subjecting him to forfeitures, unjust enrichment dangers. The default language 
of Exhibit 1 are quite onerous, and led him to utilize the Declaratory Judgment 
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Act, and the Deposit in Court procedures as a manifestation of equity, clean 
hands. Had this procedure not been utilized, the default measures threatened 
by defendants would have put plaintiff in an impossible, unconscionable position. 
Defendants put plaintiff in the position of a forgerer, that he had obtained 
"the signature of the Youngs by trickery ... artifice or deceit." These are 
vague uses of fraud, all aspects of which the court will enquire into, and 
the trial court opened all such doors. It was for this risk that plaintiff 
played an open hand. It concealed nothing. Note at pages 158, 167 of the 
Record, defendants' counsel stated: "if the change was made before he (Youngs) 
placed his signature on the purported agreement that it was done surreptitious-
ly or by fraud." See INTERNATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE v LEWIS, 530 P2 517, Oreg. 
1974. 
"Mistake" is also an equitable doctrine. The trial court conceived this 
as an equity case. Mistake is treated in next section. The ultimate finding 
by the court results in "reformation" of Exhibit 1; this is clearly an equi-
table doctrine. 
By the proper allocation of the burden of proof, it lay on defendants 
to establish the 1972-to-1973 change did not occur "mutually" at the bank and 
was accomplished thereafter. The California court's finding that the altered 
payment schedule was prepared and appended after execution of the main instru-
ment, and without assent from the Estate was proper and makes good law. Plain-
tiff Roadside pleaded affirmatively that the modified instrument was appended 
to the contract when executed. It did not sustain its burden and the findings 
in its favor was reversed. 
HE MHO AFFIRMS MUST PROVE, 
At page 1254 of the annotation 23 ALR 2d the statement appears: "... 
almost the only principle whose application is universal in the absence of 
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any policy of presumption to the contrary is embodied in the maxim: 'He who 
affirms must prove'." RELIANCE INSURANCE v BURGESS, supra is cited. Then ap-
pears BAUER v CLARK, a 7th Circuit Court case 161 F2d 397, cert den 332 US 839. 
Bauer was a case very kin procedurally to the case at bar. Plaintiff alleged 
he was a naturalized citizen and that defendant (attorney general) had deprived 
him of rights; he asked for restoration of his rights and freedom from deportat-
ion. At this point plaintiff has established a burden. Defendant admitted that 
plaintiff had become a citizen by naturalization but that as he had expatriated 
himself in war activity his citizenship must be revoked. Thus at the outset, 
under doctrines established above, who would be entitled to judgment in the ab-
sence of evidence? The appeal court said plaintiff, because of the affirmative 
pleas. Thus, as in the case at bar, the burden of going forward shifted to "he 
who affirms." Trial was had in which the unpatriotic behavior of plaintiff in-
cluding his becoming a spy, was deplored; the findings against plaintiff were 
said to not be substantially supported in the evidence. The appeal court cited 
RELIANCE LIFE INSURANCE v BURGESS, supra as setting the law of the case. The 
court quoted: 
It is a fundamental rule that the burden of proof in its primary 
sense rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings, 
asserts the affirmative of an issue and it remains there until 
the termination of the action. It is generally upon the party 
who will be defeated if no evidence relating to the issue is 
given on either side. 
The court then applied said rule, noting the state of the pleadings: 
The burden of course would have been upon plaintiff to prove 
such allegations if they had been denied, but they were ex-
pressly admitted by defendant in his answer. Such being the 
case, the plaintiff without proof would have been entitled to 
a judgment. We think the burden was clearly upon the defendant 
to establish such affirmative allegations, (emphasis added) 
GRAY v DEFA 135 P2d 251 and 153 P2d 544 
DENNY v DARRAUGH 279 SW 1069 
FIRST NATL. BANK v FORD 216 P 691, 31 ALR 1441 
McNALLY v MOSER 122 A2d 555, 60 ALR 2d 388 
MONONA COUNTY v GRAY 206 NW 26 
_oi 
POINT THREE 
TIT THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ALTERATION WAS THE RESULT 
OF AN INADVERTENCE OR MISTAKE 
The finding at page R 390 of the record (memorandum decision R 379) of in-
advertence or mistake is not pleaded, is not supported in the evidence, is con-
trary to the evidence, and against law. The court called the change from 1972 
to 1973 "a relinquishment ... of $4100 in interest" and that it is. In the same 
number 3 finding, the court said "... and the fact that the third original did 
not bear the alteration it would appear that the alteration of the date in 
question was the result of an inadvertence or mistake rather than pursuant to 
agreement between the parties." 
A. THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF ALTERATION MUST BE PLEADED. 
Rule 8(c) URCP clearly states that "... a party shall set forth affirmativ-
ely ... any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." De-
fendant complied and answered with a plea of alteration. It made no mention or 
hint it would rely on "mistake" or "reformation" which was what they got. At 
41 AJ #159 it is stated: "Affirmative and new matter as defined ... which a 
defendant must generally plead if he wishes to avail himself thereof, includes 
... alteration of instruments, duress or undue influence, fraud, mistake ..." 
Defendants failed to plead "mistake" yet the ultimate disposition of the case 
rests on such a finding. Defendants did not prove mistake or inadvertence. 
Defendants achieved a "reformation" without pleadings. 
•••.(' 
EXHIBIT ONE IS CONTROLLING: • 
As a preliminary: please note that page 3, paragraph III of Exhibits 1, 2, 
and 3 all clearly admonished that "all documents appurtenant to or used in con-
nection with this agreement" shalj^ be escrowed^ this to include "the original of 
this agreement..." Exhibit 1 is within the escrow. Exhibit 3 is not. Yet the 
court has predicated its finding of mistake and inadvertence with the resultant 
reformation on "the fact that the third original did not bear the alteration". 
Please bear in mind plaintiff participated in allowing Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 to 
come in because the burden had been placed on him by the court (unlawfully); 
as a part of going forward, the law is clear that in the face of an obvious 
alteration, the party offering the instrument must explain the alteration. 
Plaintiff pleaded Exhibit "A" which turned into Exhibit "1". Defendants ad-
mitted execution and delivery into escrow thereof. Prior to the trial plain-
tiff moved that Exhibit "I" known in the testimony as Exhibit 3 and all reference 
thereto in defendants' answer be stricken. This court has admonished many times 
that the plain meaning of words in a contract must be given their natural mean-
ing. There can be no escape from the mandate of page 3, paragraph III, yet the 
court has predicated its findings and decision on a violation of that provision, 
thus making Exhibit 3 relevant, material. Neither exhibits 2 or 3 are "appurt-
enant" to the original; they are not a part of the escrow and are immaterial. 
(R 328) Late in the trial plaintiff renewed said motion but the court denied 
it; however plaintiff asked the court to reserve an ultimate ruling on the rele-
vance and materiality of Exhibit 3 until the end of the trial, which the court 
granted. (Tr 127, 128) Whatever the court's thinking the true significance of 
paragraph III of page 3 has never been met nor commented upon. It was error to 
ignore such an important provision, and it has led to all of the wrong results 
following, including predicating the finding of mistake on the difference be-
tween Exhibits 1 and 3. It was error for it to fail to make a finding that said 
language was material or immaterial to the case 
B. THE MISTAKE IF ANY COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MUTUAL. 
By the very language quoted above and as it appears in Finding 3, the 
court disposed of the possibility; any possible mistake so found is not mutual. 
The court itself held the mistaken matter was not "pursuant to agreement between 
the parties." Clearly to be distinguished from the facts is BOARD OF EDUCATION 
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SEVIER DIST. vs BOARD OF EDUC. PIUTE, 85 Utah 276, 39 P2d 340, 1934. The mut-
uality found by this court to exist in NAISBITT v HODGES, 307 P2 620 1957 or 
SINE v HARPER 222 P2d 571, 1950 is absent in the case at bar. The only mistake 
that may be argued is unilateral. 
This court in 1897 laid out criteria for mutual mistake in the alteration 
of an instrument in McCLURE v LITTLE, DESERET SAVING BANK 49 ^298. Plaintiff 
bank asked for reformation of the note to permit addition of the word "semi-
annually" in a note that otherwise would read for interest to be paid annually. 
A payee had made the change after payor's signature. The court held the alte-
ration to have been innocently made, to correct a mutual mistake, and allowed 
the "reformation" of the note. It stated: "A court of equity has the power to 
so decree and thereby restore the instrument to its original condition." 
a finding of 
In the case at bar, there is/'reformation" without request in the plead-
ings. There iis not restoration to original intents but acceptance of a foreign 
claim in the face of logical offer and acceptance language. Our case is cert-
ainly in equity. The court itself has treated defendants' answer as a demand 
for "reformation", clearly an equitable doctrine. Because of the manner of our 
findings, there cannot ever be affirmed a "mutual mistake" as in McClure. The 
appeal court may examine the record de nova. 
C. UNILATERAL MISTAKE NOT AVAILABLE HERE. 
We have tried to assimilate the Utah cases adverted to by Greene in 
"MISTAKE IN CONTRACTS", Utah Law Review, Vol 7 No. 3 at page 304. It would ap-
pear that Greene's conclusion is well founded: "The well-settled general rule 
in Utah is that a mistake on the part of one party only is not redressable." 
The doctrines are well discussed by this court in ASHW0RTH v CHARLESW0RTH, 231 
P2d 724 where the court held: "But a contract will not be reformed for an un-
ilateral mistake." Please note the defendants in the case at bar did not ask 
for reformation, -.mistake, recision or any of the remedies connected with 
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mistake. They inferred fraud but were afraid to name it, the same with forgery. 
Let us look at the four criteria laid down in Ashworth: 
(1) The mistake must be of so grave a consequence that to enforce the 
contract as actually made would be unconscionable. (This is Exhibit 1. By its 
own terms it does not include exhibits 2 nor 3.) Search the testimony and look 
for conscience! Plaintiff laid it down as a counter offer that he could not 
carry the load financially without the interest concession. The simplest doc-
trines of offer and acceptance (with counter offer and acceptance) must be 
brought to bear here. Defendants accepted his counter offer as shown by their 
agreement, signatures and initials. (Tr 28, 66, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 74, 83, 86, 
93, 94, 95) nQ. One last question: As I understand your testimony you stated 
a condition of your purchase that the interest not begin to accrue until the 
date it shows on Exhibit 1? A. That' right." (Tr 98) The unconscionable bur-
den is imposed on plaintiff who made clear he could not and would not buy if the 
concession was not made. Within the first year, the sellers had received ap-
proximately half of the purchase price, and had reduced the acres by 4. (Tr 84) 
The concession was not onerous. It is uncommon to sell a farm for $125,000 and 
get the full consideration within three and a half years, (the final payment was 
due November 18, 1975; there is nothing in the file to show default other than 
the $4100 on deposit.) 
(2) "The matter ... must relate to a material feature of the contract." 
No argument. The alteration as appearing on Exhibit 1 is important, a material 
feature of the entire contract. There would have been no contract without the 
concession! There w ^ • s J 9 n g . t " r ^ . . K n Q w i n g 1 y on Exhibit 3 alone! 
Banker Meagher would not have loaned the $33,000 down payment. (Tr 24, 28) 
ExJybjJtJL^ Meagherjs not the meeting of the minds of the 
parties. The only reason Exhibit 3 is initialed and signed is inadvertence and 
mistake on the part of plaintiff. (R 122) The same inadvertence when plaintiff 
received the notice of assignment without reading it. (Ex 4, 5, Tr 90 f 91) 
(3) "Generally the mistake must have occurred notwithstanding the exer-
cise of ordinary diligency by the party making the mistake." The trial judge 
did not specify whiD had made the mistake. Certainly Plaj'Jltiff_djd not make the 
mistake. His purchase was conditioned on the alteration. The only fact about 
the change plaintiff could not explain was whose specific hand had written in 
the large "3". After 3k years that is not surprising. There is good evidence 
of plaintiff and his witnesses trying to be honest, candid, equitable in their 
testimony. They did not show the coaching that would have been profitable, 
possible. When they couldn't remember they said so. (This left Exhibit 1 to 
speak for itself, as it spoke in the motions for summary judgment.) Exhibit one 
is the best evidence but the trial court has turned it into secondary. May it 
be kept in mind that defendants1 had their lawyer at their side for part of the 
time. He had drawn the instrument that had to be modified. They had the 
expertise, not plaintiff. As the parties finally agreed, all three instruments 
were worked upon. Most of the time David Sam held the original. 90% of the 
changes are in his hand. (Tr 145) The attempts to conform were illusory. The 
documents do not conform in many particulars, some important as on page 2 line 
21, and some unimportant. A study of this will show that Exhibit 1 was the in-
strument all eyes must be on, and should have been. Banker Meagher asked them 
all to initial their changes. He had in mind the "meat" of the changes, so he 
said. (Tr 53,59, 60) It is unthinkable that a court would hold the initials 
on page two would not reach up and down to the "meat", to the essence. All 
lawyers have gone through the problems on that page for the life of their practi 
It will take a lot of stretching to find (as the court erroneously did) that the 
initials on page 2 were limited to the matters appearing on lines 23, 24, 25. 
Would it not be logical, in terms of the results of this case, to confine Alma 
Young's initials to line 25 only? Possibly they could reach to Line 24.! What 
held these parties at the negotiating table from 10:30 in the morning until 3 
in the afternoon? One must search for the "meat" of the thing, the changes that 
meant there could be a sale, or not, Meagher testified the thing that held them 
together was "too much money the first year." (Tr 28) 
There are three "meaty" changes in the instrument: it was imperative that 
the payments fall due not in cold January, but in November when the cattle are 
sold. On page 5, at the end of the default clauses the benevolence of sellers 
shown through: not only had the scriviner been allerted to the need for some 
indulgence, but the parties at the table made sure if plaintiff was in diffi-
culty the first year, the $12,000 and the $22,921 payments with interest would 
be renogotiable if the buyer met trouble. (Shades of lack of mutuality, but as 
plaintiff was able to pay and did, no problem resulted.) Then there was the 
third major item, that of deferal of interest accrual until April 10, 1973. 
Indeed there was need for talk. Plaintiff sons testified Mrs. Young argued 
about the deferal. (Tr 104, 113) While Attorney Sam wants to say there was no 
talk, yet in his closing argument to the trial court he wanted it both ways: 
He wrote "The plaintiff own witnesses, while claiming there was discussion de-
clared that Mrs. Young said it was not right and would not agree to it." (R 359 
top) When Mr. Sam was counsel for the Youngs and also their witness, his argu-
ment may have less than persuasiveness. 
Note the writing of "November" on P. 2 line 24: This is in the hand of 
Plaintiff was being "diligent11 on things esaential. 
plaintiff himself on all three copies./(Tr 69, 70) It is interesting to note 
the change, interliniation in plaintiff's Exhibit 2 of "April", line 18. Why 
was this not specially initialed? Mrs. Young's "A" in April is the same as her 
"Alma". The April in Exhibit 1 is in Sam's hand. Again, who wrote or printed 
the "November" on line 26 of each copy of the contract? Mr. Meagher acknowledged 
printing it with his special pen on Exhibit 1 (Tr 58) The same blue ink as the 
water certificates on page 1 of Exhibit 1. (Tr 33, 55) 
'V* 
-' f 
would have been no acceptance of the offer; there would have been no contract, 
no payment of $33,000 down, $12,000 plus interest on December 31, 1972, plus 
assumption of the payments on the Floyd Case place, and assumption of payments 
on the bailer. (Tr 68, 72, 82, 86, 94, 98) The final words of number 4 say: 
"In other words, it must be possible to put him in statu quo." No court could 
put these people back into statu quo! Defendants wanted and got Bumbleberry. 
(Tr 23, 122, 136) Plaintiff wanted and got the dairy farm and cows, but he paid 
everything he agreed to pay down to the filing of the complaint (including the 
contested interest.) This would be all but two $22,921 final installments plus 
interest. This would embrace close to $80,000 defendants had received. It was 
and is impossible to put these people into "statu quo." The theory of mistake 
and recision is an after thought, not a part of the agreement had between the 
parties. As such it is error, reversable. 
Indeed, unilateral mistake does not work anything in this case but error! 
This court in 6ARFF REALTY v BETTER BUILDINGS 234 P2 842, 1951 did not help 
the trial court. In that case, as in this, the listing defendant "denied there 
was any conversation on that subject." This court found "There was no plea of 
mistake, fraud or overreaching, or of misrepresentation." In the state of the 
pleadings and contentions in Garff, the court was led to say such "does not suf-
ficiently state any legal defense ... Ignorance of the contents of an instrument 
does not ordinarily affect the liability of one who signs it." Mr. and Mrs. Young 
said the subject of the contested change was not discussed; but it clearly appears 
over their verified signatures and by any sensible analysis, over their initials 
which certainly reach to the central point of the sale. 
In STARLEY v DESERET FOODS, 74 P2d 1221, 1938 Judge Folland discussed the 
similar problem of unilateral mistake. Defendant co-maker of the note tried to 
negate personal liability by pleading and testifying he had intended to write 
"secretary" by his name, but didn't. He failed to make unilateral mistake hold, 
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thus \ imrl observing: 
In the absence of fraud, duress, or oppression, parol evidence 
will not be received to explain or modify an instrument, unless 
there is something on the face thereof or in the manner of the 
signature to create an ambiguity or uncertainty as to the lia-
bility of the party signing, or unless there was a mutual mistake 
of fact as to the signing of the instrument 
This court has many times held that in the absence of fraud, mis-
take, or ambiguity parol evidence is inadmissible to vary or ex-
plain the terms of a written instrument. 
The court found there was no mutual mistake. The only question 
before us...is as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the court's holding Before we should be justified in setting 
the judgment aside we must be satisfied that the clear preponde-
rence of the evidence is against such a finding. We are not so 
satisfied. To justify a finding of mutual mistake of fact, the 
evidence of such mistake must be clear, convincing and satisfying 
• • • A mistake j)n_ ones i de_ of a unilateral mis ta ke jrf f a ctjhs 
ground for reversaT only wTien such "mistake isTncfucecT by fraud 
/... There"!s no allegation or indeed any suggestion that the 
mistake of Morgan was induced by fraud ... The mistake was one 
of his conception of the law. 
fraui is to Lilly Ki'kinq in Uir; ease, os einir^ 'tinn from pbnnfiff, 
Some interesting application of ihe law appears by this court's opinion 
arid the dissent, in STATF v UNION CONSTRUCTION, 339 P2J 4,M, 9 IPd JO7, 1959 
[he plaintiff v/< 'Vn'slpd" by some old stakes and a ret^ flaq as to the route of 
a road being bid. Certainly he made a costly mistake tor which the majority gave 
mercy, not Judqe Henroid's dissent, f he rational ef tk dissent pninU up import-
ant auLlioMty lor use in the case at bar, ASHWORTH v CHARLESWORTH, supra, is 
held by the dissent to be important law, to be unhuld. The principles discussed 
arc1 included above in uur reproduction nt the i ritena (if urtilaLra! mistakes; we 
will not repeat. We will advert to the wilhston on Contracts quote (Sec 1577 . 
p 4407) 
"Where the signer of a writing has made an innocent mistake 
as to nature of his act without carelessness, whether in-
duced by fraud or not, the writing is not his expression and 
there is no contract. But if a man acts negligently, and in 
such a way as to justify others in supposing that the terms 
of the writing are assented to by him and the writing is ac-
cepted on that supposition, he will be bound both in law and 
in equity?1 ' ' — 
if i 
(Emphasis added by the dissent). There was and is negligence in the failure of 
defendants to make good conformance of Exhibit 3 with Exhibit 1. Defendants 
initialed in a way that led the banker to believe the "meat" of the changes had 
been agreed to on page 2 of exhibit 1. (Tr 29, 31, 36, 37, 38, 42, 44, 46, 53, 
54, 58, 59, 60) He had the instrument acknowledged after carefully reading it, 
with the changes, back to the parties, to which he testified assent had been 
clearly given. He placed it in escrow with 2000 other escrows. (Tr 51) On No-
vember 18, 1973 when the payment was due, he met plaintiff and his boys on the 
question as to what amount the check should cover in principal and interest. He 
got the note, figured what was due, wrote in on the face of a check, and the plain-
tiff signed it without incident. (Ex 6, Tr 38, 39, 75) Near two months later, 
defendants, if they did not realize the wind-fall of Exhibit 3 earlier, discovered 
that plaintiff had initialed exhibit 3, page 2 and wrote thru counsel the default 
letter, Exhibit 10. For the first time plaintiff and then Mr. Meagher came to 
realize something was wrong. Up to receipt of the default letter, the banker, 
plaintiff and his two boys were justified in "supposing that the terms of the 
writing are assented to." (to quote from Williston above.) 
This being a case involving many doctrines of equity, a modest comment on 
the equities ought to be permissible. It is likely that when the argument ensued 
between plaintiff and Mrs. Young over the condition precedent uttered by plaintiff 
that the interest must not begin to accrue until April 10, 1973, as testified to 
by the sons, (Tr 104, 113) Mrs. Young was compelled to add her initials to the 
others on page 2 of Exhibits 1 and 2, but secretly she withheld the conforming 
change on her own copy. Here was the inate possibility of the real fraud of the 
transaction. Everyone was being quite diligent but Mrs. Young (Tr 134) She was 
the one person who held the piece of evidence that might be used later to defeat 
the condition precedent plaintiff had announced. That her memory was not good, 
and she could be mistaken, consider the time the parties were together, with and 
without David Sam. ^ j t ^ r s . young t e s t i f i e d Sam was "present from t k i time we 
# 
co'^v-;.- . • \ •• • :- '•-)e Fserow Agreements were signed." (Tr 140) Mr, Meagher 
said the par t ies came to the bank at II AM and s t a r t ed negot ia t ing , concluding 
a t 3:15. (Tr 43) P la in t i f f said they HI rived .it ln : i0 AM Sam (jot; there hut 
went to a funeral before t iny finished (Tr M) f isher said the conference 
las ted as much as 2\> hour*., (Tr 111) Sam t e s t i f i e d he did not a t n v f .it the 
bank unti l ?;ii) m I PM. Mi I'M) It was not pi a iiitif t *s burden to prove strh 
fraud in the inducement, In t i u th i t should be t rea ted as immaterial, hut when 
the t r i a l com t has predicated i K finding c*nd .judgment of misfake on what appears 
in Exhibit J» that instrument, and not Exhibit 1 snows up suf f ic ien t t a i n t as to 
reveal the real pos s ib i l i t y ot "fraud or overreaching, or of misrepresentation" 
as touriri in (hi*, m u ' t ' s opm-en n \A\n\ v UfllLk liUILDINbS, supra, Jt adds in-
st i l l tu injury to find the t r i a l court has rel ieved defendants uf the burden of 
going forward with c lear and convincing, s a t i s f ac to ry , ayidetire. and IMI .placed 
burden on p ' a m l i t f who has MMt (he s l i g h t e s t t a i n t nor cu lpab i l i t y . He who 
a t t a cks , a s s a i l s , affirms had be t t e r prove, we found in the long annotation a t 23 
ALR ?d 1?43. P la in t i f f cal led HIH bltilf or defendants by i n s i s t m u trial the i r 
plea oi a l t e r a t i un amounted to a "forgery" to WIIMII tlie court agreed, in the 
broadest sense, (!r 1'i) But defendants were always reluctant when the >nh;iett 
came u|i in court ui faro rbe essent ia l essence of (hei r a l l eqa t ion . Mistake and 
forgery ate noL tljp same thing. Mistake can be innocent; forgery never, A mis-
take was made in fhe contract negotiat ions hut not by defendants I.OI fit' fltachta . 
lhr mistake wa * < I t .u ly in p l . m i l i l l i n i t i a l i n g Lxhibit 3 on page 2 wifiiout the 
r equ i s i t e care to see that i t conformed to Exhibit I and 2. Also in f a i l i ng to 
read Exhibits 4, 5. 
The cour t , e r r e d In f a l l i n g to make a f i n d i n g of '• " •"• 
WHEN nod BY WHOM tduj n i in t aken a K u r a c l o n waff made . l • "• * 
A study of the hand writing by the Youngs, Sam, Hartman, and Nick Meagher 
must be indulged within this court. Sam takes much responsibility for his entries. 
His writing can be quite well identified, as can the others. Mr. Meagher's hand 
is in the water stock on page 1 of Exhibit one. There are several "3" numerals 
there for comparison. On line 15 of each exhibit on page 2 there is a "3" to be 
compared to the one altering on line 21. One must note the color of ink. On ex-
hibit 2, the hand writing, color of ink, and the nature of "3" is to be noted, in 
two places. What will this court see in the color of ink on Exhibit 2, ( a bright 
blue) as compared with the "3" on the original at line 21? There are no easy 
answers. These are to be contrasted with the writing and color of ink on de-
fendants' own copy, Exhibit 3. There is something characteristic in the writing 
of all five of the witnesses who testified on this subject. Admittedly there is 
mystery on the subject. How many colors of ink does the court see? But burden 
of proof doctrines have been used widely to cover dilima in this area. There 
are some "3"s in Exhibit 6 which is the hand of Meagher. 
No one is trying to conceal anything, on plaintiff's side of the case. Il-
lumination is all that is needed. Illumination without coaching. That the rec-
ord shows in plaintiff's side of the testimony. Plaintiff was not trying to hide 
anything in his candid statements that he did not know, could not remember, it 
was quite a long time to look back. Plaintiff's counsel never tried to influence 
how the testimony came in on this crucial point. Had he done so, it would have 
"smelled of the lamp". 
Because plaintiff 
had made it a condition of buying that the change be made, and he had the instal-
ls it possible 
ment in his hand to write the "November",/he could have made the change at the 
time of his insistence? When the Youngs signed with it there, they must allege 
kZ 
and pi ove I rand In he rclievnl f her ei rom. there has been no opportunity in the 
record for the alteration to have happened since it went into the hands of Mr. 
Meagher1, wai; read by hnTi and signed lining o member of the bar, and ot "long ex-
perience at the bank, taught by an ethical and able father, the business of a 
bank, considerable credence must attach to Nick Meagher's attempt to be honest, 
Ihe unit i did tio(~ feel that way. I ho equities ot the case 
require attention. Jn this court's holding in STARLEY v DESERET FOODS supra there 
\y • :.'.*• for consideration of "fraud, durpss, oppression" in Hie creation and use 
i •* - '/o hate Lo say 11L 
»r cardinal ?>^ j r in Hi is case is the fa i 1 u r,f * of the court to require de-
fendants, under t h r u nl«»(V , fu prove bv "clear, definite, and lonvinciny" evi-
dence what they had affirmatively alleged. Instead ihe court required plaintiff 
to look down the barrel I of the qnn boinq pointed bv defendants with all triggers 
til ihe finger of defendants, ijoiie unfair, to say the least. At most, contrary 
to law, equity. The manner of applying clear and convincing is well discussed in 
SINE v HARPER, supra. This coin 1: tl lei e i ises "language that such standat < I of pr oof 
"clinches what might be otherwise oi i ly probable to the n rind." Is it not true in 
the record before this court that all defendants have is allegation? Only inuendo, 
pretense. 
:
 The 1887 case of COVER v MANAWAY, 8 Atlantic, 393 sets the base U\y the 
Utah court's insistences in a high quantum of proof whr i e f(rj Pennsylvania eout't 
rejected a ^ in»il p1 uinienl tnv wlrre f;h( "proof was flight"; "meager and incon 
elusive1", vague arid unsatisfactory. 
If is of critical importance, in the law of mistake, that the defendant/, did 
n inarnfosL a desire or intent in reunion ot the contract,, it wanted the 
contract without the changed date; and tha! is what the court gave it. This under 
law made a r lew contr act, I t w< \u u>d" ih law Ihe one the part'es had signed; yet 
why did defendant not seek recision;1 It did not even say the contract was void 
< * 
and of no effect. It wanted the advantages of the money it had received; 
it wanted more money. Mistake was never the theory of defendants nor did it 
enter the trial of the case. 
The general law of REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS is treated at 66 Am Jur 2d, 
527 with the introductory caveat: 
"Courts of equity in the exercise of their jurisdiction 
to reform written instruments, proceed with the utmost 
caution. ... Such relief when granted, must flow from, 
and be in accord with, the agreement and obligations of 
the parties, and be adapted to the condition of facts to 
which it is to be applied ... Accordingly, courts of equity 
act sparingly in the reformation " 
At most there can here be but unilateral mistake, which has been tortured into 
the equitable doctrine of mistake by the trial court. By such a finding, the 
case is headlong into REFORMATION, an equitable doctrine. Certainly the court 
must view the evidence de nova, along with a lawful view of burden of proof, 
quantum of proof. Under any of these, the findings cannot be sustained. 
POINT FOUR, 
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING RULE FOR 
THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE. 
Exhibit one was admitted in evidence without objection. The defendants 
attack it as being altered without authorization. Thus the signatured, acknowl-
edged instrument is affirmatively attacked. What quantum of proof must be em-
ployed in such an attack? At 1 Am Jur #155 that authority cautions to "view 
attempts to discredit them (acknowledged instruments) with suspicion and distrust 
... It frequently has been stated as a rule that in order to impeach a certificate 
the evidence must be clear, congent, and convincing beyond reasonable controversy." 
In the case at bar, defendants attack the acknowledged, escrowed instrument as 
altered, in effect a forgery, a fraud. 
This court has long adhered to the rule that one who asserts invalidity to 
an acknowledged instrument must so prove by clear and convincing evidence. Mr. 
Justice Crockett wrote for the uiur' m NORMCRFSl v WALKER BANK, 12? !j 268, 248 
P?d 692, 195? that the attack on a deed had been successfully met as a forgery, 
noting proof at three prongs; 
It is t!lie that such acknowledgment and recordation give 
rise to a presumption of the genuiness and the due execution 
and delivery of the deed and is prima facie evidence thereof. 
This presumption should not be regarded lightly but should be 
given great weight. The authorities generally hold that the 
effect of such certificate of acknowledgment will not be over-
thrown upon a mere preponderence of the evidence, but it must 
be clear and convincing. 
Our t^ i.ii sour! did not apply this rule to the attack on the instrument, When 
defendants admitted their signatures and pleaded an avoidance, the Utah cases re-
quired they establish such at tirmat i vt defense by the above standard™ The court. 
pen.iiffHi! iriuendo, allegation to faf;e the place of solid evidence. When defend-
ants had admitted they had no "hard" evidence, hased on their answer^ admitting 
execution, verification, all ihpy could do was hope to impeach the alteration as 
unassented to. They had to show fraud at the inception or a forgery after ft 
entered the escrow. Ihus *he ^m* of < ascr- incident to the quantum of proof are 
opposite,, I'he a r t M e in I Am. dui at section \% states: 
The decisions disclose a very decided tendency or i the part 
of the courts to attach weight to certificates of acknowl-
edgment and to view attempts to discredit them with sus-
picion and distrust. Consequently, in all cases, whether 
in proving fraud, duress, o? imposition, or in establishing 
any other defense to overcome the force of the certificate, 
a high degree of proof is required. It frequently has been 
1
 stated as a rule that in order to impeach a certificate, the 
evidence must be clear, cogent, and convincing beyond reasonable 
controversy. Various other expressions have also been used. 
It has been said that such evidence must be almost as strong 
as that required to correct a mistake in a deed. Thus, it 
appears that the burden assumed by the assailant of the cer-
tificate is, if the language of the rule is to be understood 
in its literal sense, much greater than that usually cast 
upon a party by a presumption of fact. Generally, a mere 
preponderance of evidence is not sufficient to overcome the 
certificate. Certainly a certificate supported by the offi-
cer's testimony cannot be overcome by evidence which is vague, 
meager, and inconclusive. 
45 
Please note the Utah statute: 
78-25-7. Certificate of acknowledgment as evidence of 
execution. Every private writing, except last wills 
and testaments, may be acknowledged or proved, and cert-
ified in the manner provided for the acknowledgment or 
proof of conveyances of real property, and the certificate 
of such acknowledgment or proof is prima facie evidence 
of the execution of the acknowledgment or proof is prima 
facie evidence of the execution of the writing in the same 
manner as if it were a conveyance of real property. 
This gives rise to a presumption of regularity to Exhibit 1. When plaintiff 
"explained" the nature of the negotiations and how the alteration on page 2 line 
21 occurred, the prima facie case was complete. Plaintiff satisfied the require-
ment of the Utah statute 78-25-17 in accounting for the alteration under attack. 
The burden of going forward with evidence shifted to defendants. Facts to the 
contrary of the prima facie case never came. This court said IN RE SWAN'S 
ESTATE 293 P2d 682: 
"Ordinarily the burden of persua ion, as distinguished 
from the burden of making a prima facie case from which 
the fact finder could reasonably find the issue in his 
favor, is on the party whose claim for relief depends on 
the existence of such fact. Usually such party must plead 
and prove the existence of such fact in order to prevail." 
The trial court's handling of this case was quite to the contrary. This court 
found "Clear and Convincing evidence to be adduced in COREY v ROBERTS. 25 P2 940. 
In CHUGG v CHUGG, 342 P2d 875, 9 U2d 256 an elderly dairyman optioned and then 
deeded his place to a cousin only to have other relatives bring suit to overturn 
the deeds. This court held it was an equity case, and stated: "The deed and 
bill of sale ... are in proper form ... the deed is duly acknowledged, recorded. 
This establishes prima facie the genuineness of the transaction and casts upon 
the party attacking it the burden of showing invalidity of the documents by clear 
and convincing evidence." The attack failed. 
This court held in RICHMOND v BALLARD 325 P2d 839, 7 U2d 341, 1958 that in 
attacking a formal instrument the party "must do more than merely raise a suspicion. 
>6 
(hen must be some affirmative evidence ... Such cvidt'iio/ lb almost totally lack-
ing hero ... it is true that a fffidnnj i,f u rid no influence cannot rer t on mere 
suspicion i the u n umstances relied on should clearly point out the person 
who is alleged to exercise the undue influence.' Thc findings were not predi-
cated on evidence and the judgment was reversed. 
GREENER v GREENER^ j t # 2±2 ?2d 19k 
On its face the verification in Exhibit I savs the Imwqs 'duly acknowl-
edged to we that the> executed the seiic " • he answer admitted paragraph 3 of 
the complaint bw* end the exhibit was not in the form like Exhibit 3 iftis «s 
an rfff irpianvo defense attacking the insfrumerit. \\M L'ywTint) court considered 
a like claim in ADAM!.; v SMITH, -'0 f net;, !9U I 
The '.di!!!1 Wyoming court held that the signature verified U\ ]^ hf ni-tery public 
'"shall be received as presumptive evidence of I he far Is contained in such certif-
icate", but thc party .n<*v 'oniMdic/ the certificate of the notary, Fori; to 
"ijiipeach the certificate the evidence must be cogent, clear dud convincing." 
ROWRAY v CASPER MiJf. BUILDING LOAN, ^ p?d 7, 1915, 
in MATHHi v dAKl , thv Missouri court held in UMK, B (™od .W> rfvn ,fa 
ct• t'i. Ffu* t-?'• <J-1 dcknowledgment is proof of a high grade of the facts it asserts, 
and it cannot be fjverthrown oxoyf by proof fhat is clear, cogent and convincing, 
A less stringent JJJ I e. ... would render titles to real estate very insecure." 
The Idaho court held in f'l EGfJ v IIM^U ;rl7 P 4^8, 1925; 
"A certificate of acknowledgment, complete and regular on 
its face, raises a presumption in favor of the truth of 
every fact recited therein ...~ The burden of proving a 
state of facts which will overcome the probative force of 
the certificate is upon the party assailing it, and it seems 
to be the rule that the testimony of the party acknowledging 
the instrument is insufficient tr :vercome the force of the 
certificate.' 
Hie effect of uu< f.ourt (. Jindings arid i.onclusions is the making of a new 
ontract between the parties which did n-y vprese;ii ary oMer, acceptance, or 
eeting of the minds. Note whdl fhe utah court said in EPHRAIM THEATRE v HAWK 
21 P2d 221: 
"Unless there is ambiguity or uncertainty in the language 
so that the meaning is confused, or is susceptible of more 
than one meaning, there is no justification for interpretat-
ion or explanation from extraneous sources. It would defeat 
the very purpose of formal contracts to permit a party to 
invoke the use of words or conduct inconsistent with its 
terms to prove that the parties did not mean what they said, 
or to use such inconsistent words or conduct to demonstrate 
uncertainty or ambiguity where none would otherwise exist. 
Generally speaking, neither of the parties, nor the court 
has any right to ignore or modify conditions which are 
clearly expressed merely because it may subject one of the 
parties to hardship, but they must be enforced uin accord-
ance with the intention as ... manifested by the language 
used by the parties to the contract." 
MOODY v SMITH 340 P2d 83, 9 U2d 139 
RICHLANDS IRR. CO. v. WESTVIEW IRR-. CO., 80 P2 458, 1938 
GENERAL INSURANCE v HENICH 13 U2d 231, 371 P2 642 
WARE v JULIAN 9 P 2d 906 
RIVERA v RON 125 P2d 517 
Estoppel doctrines forbid the court to impose such new provisions, par-
ticularly when plaintiff changed his position in reliance on the instrument as 
filed. He paid all of the money owed. He transfered the purchased property to 
his two sons. 
CONCLUSION 
There can be no doubt but that the evidence does not support the findings, 
conclusions, the judgment. The evidence is contrary thereto. The evidence pre-
ponderates against the findings. The evidence and findings are contrary to the 
plsedings. The evidence is insufficient to sustain the findings, conclusions. 
They are contrary to law. The court did not make a clear finding on alteration; 
what it did find is obscure. It was error for the court to find that the initials 
did not reach the contested, alleged alteration. An estoppel should have been 
found. The court should decree that plaintiff is enti tl e*K^ a return of the 
deposit with interest credit, reserving attorney fees /to plaintiff. 
\ / 
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